The question is central to much hand-wringing over the blurring of the lines between science and activism. It implicitly equates "good science" with "objective" science, science untainted by any hint of "politics" or social values. With objectivity as a litmus test, any scientific claims made by scientists with a position on an issue are automatically suspect, no matter how well grounded in evidence they may be.
However, as I explained to the reporter, the sharp distinction between objective science and value-laden science crumbles under close examination: one cannot do science without making value judgments. As a result, I suggested, the way to assess the reliability or trustworthiness of science is not to scrutinize investigators' personal views on the issue; the fact that the citizen scientists had a position on fracking did not automatically make their study "bad science." Instead, drawing on the insights of philosophy and sociology of science, we should evaluate scientific claims by asking what values inform scientific claims and how they came into play in the research process -questions that apply equally to citizen science, with its overtly political agendas, and academic science, with its aura of objectivity.
Contrary to popular perceptions, all science involves values. To do their work, scientists must make judgments about what research questions are worthwhile, how they should talk about their findings, and whether they should err on the side of false positives or false negatives [Elliot, 2011] . Often a discipline will have an accepted way of answering these questions -requiring a certain level of statistical significance before accepting a hypothesis, for example -but those disciplinary standards still represent value judgments.
Citizen science linked to activism 1 differs from academic science not in having values, as the reporter suggested, but in making the value judgments necessary to science differently than academic scientists would. Communities that use buckets, for example, think it worthwhile to study air quality near petrochemical facilities and other "hot spots," where environmental regulators historically looked at overall air quality for a region [Ottinger, 2010] . Citizen scientists also have different values in assessing evidence. Academic epidemiologists, for example, favor false negatives, where communities doing "popular epidemiology," tend to prefer false positives. If chemical contamination may be causing disease, they would prefer to err on the side of caution and act to protect people's health, even if their evidence does not meet epidemiologists' standards for statistical significance [Brown, 1992] .
Philosophers who reject the idea that science should be value-free suggest that scientists should be transparent about the value judgments they make in their work. Doing so, they argue, would help policy makers and the citizenry to better understand how to assess information, especially in light of competing scientific claims [Douglas, 2009; Elliot, 2011] . Citizen science contributes to this transparency: by making value judgments differently, citizen scientists expose the taken-for-granted values inherent in academic and regulatory science, inviting broader discussion of our priorities: certainty or protectiveness? Fine-grained attention to problem areas, or understanding of broader trends?
Equating "good science" with "value-free science," as most people do, robs us of the opportunity to have a critical discussion of our values. It also, I contend, makes communication harder for scientists whose responsible, thorough, rigorous research has led them to conclude that policy action is imperative. How are they to convince the public that their facts should be trusted? If objectivity is the ideal, then any science that can be shown to have values -as all science can -is too easily dismissed as "just political."
Abandoning a value-free ideal and talking about value judgments would offer a way to distinguishing between equally responsible scientific studies with conflicting implications for policy. If scientists were more transparent about how they chose research questions, metrics, and standards of proof in a way that present them not as inevitable but as reasoned judgments from a particular perspective, the public would be better able to weigh heterogeneous scientific claims.
There are, of course, notable cases of corruption in science, where inconvenient data were suppressed or corroborating data fabricated [e.g. Oreskes and Conway, 2010; Proctor, 2012] . But the corruption was not a result of scientists' having values, but of their allowing them to play a direct role in their collection and interpretation of data [Douglas, 2009] . In short, scientists' explicit desire for a particular outcome colored important aspects of their investigation, such as deciding which measurements to include in a data set or whether to report results at all. Science, including citizen science, should be able to inform political action without being dismissed as "activist." To achieve that end, we need to broaden our definition of "good science." While we ought to exclude corrupt science that makes inappropriately direct use of values, we should also accept that responsibly conducted research necessarily involves value judgments, and that those value judgments may differ between citizen scientists, academic scientists, and regulatory scientists [Liévanos, London and Sze, 2011] or even across academic disciplines [Sarewitz, 2004] . For science communicators, the challenge then becomes transcending the value-free ideal and communicating the heterogeneous values of scientists in a way that enables a richer public discussion.
